PSU, your thoughts?

[Tom In VA]

Why does everyone pretend that there was no plan for occupation? It's just not true:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FB13Ak01.html

According to army procedure, they developed a Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) plan, an extremely intricate master plan detailing the movements of each and every unit and the "logistics tail" (the supply of fuel, spare parts, food, etc) needed to keep that unit operational. This plan initially called for an invasion force of about 400,000, including support personnel. The original plan also envisioned the US leading a broad coalition, much like Operation Desert Storm.

However, Secretary Rumsfeld began reviewing the TPFDD in November 2002, trimming the number of personnel to about 75,000. These modifications were part of a new kind of operational thinking by Rumsfeld, who reportedly views the army planning process as cumbersome and inefficient, hobbled by bureaucracy and mired in old-style management. The army, on the other hand, views the planning as necessary to prepare for any contingency and essential to ensuring victory.

I'm curious if that count of personnel of 75,000 is limited to only uniformed military personnel.

[Tom In VA]

This plan initially called for an invasion force of about 400,000, including support personnel. The original plan also envisioned the US leading a broad coalition, much like Operation Desert Storm.

However, Secretary Rumsfeld began reviewing the TPFDD in November 2002, trimming the number of personnel to about 75,000.

And it was spectacularly successful. What's your point?

Is the plan for an "invasion" force different than a plan for an "occupational force" ?

[PSUFAN]

The point is that 75,000 is fine for smashing into Iraq, but woefully inadequate for what was to immediately follow - you know, the most crucial period of the exercise:

http://www.epic-usa.org/Default.aspx?tabid=185

The longer-term problem involved what would happen after Baghdad fell, as it inevitably would. This was distinctly an Army rather than a general military concern. "Where's the Air Force now?" an Army officer asked rhetorically last fall. "They're back on their bases—and they're better off, since they don't need to patrol the 'no-fly' zones [in northern and southern Iraq, which U.S. warplanes had patrolled since the end of the Gulf War]. The Navy's gone, and most of the Marines have been pulled back. It's the Army holding the sack of shit." A related concern involved what a long-term commitment to Iraq would do to the Army's "ops tempo," or pace of operations—especially if Reserve and National Guard members, who had no expectations of long-term foreign service when they signed up, were posted in Iraq for months or even years.

The military's fundamental argument for building up what Rumsfeld considered a wastefully large force is that it would be even more useful after Baghdad fell than during actual combat. The first few days or weeks after the fighting, in this view, were crucial in setting long-term expectations. Civilians would see that they could expect a rapid return to order, and would behave accordingly—or they would see the opposite. This was the "shock and awe" that really mattered, in the Army's view: the ability to make clear who was in charge. "Insights from successful occupations suggest that it is best to go in real heavy and then draw down fast," Conrad Crane, of the Army War College, told me. That is, a larger force would be necessary during and immediately after the war, but might mean a much smaller occupation presence six months later.

"We're in Baghdad, the regime is toppled—what's next?" Thomas White told me, recounting discussions before the war. One of the strongest advocates of a larger force was General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff. White said, "Guys like Shinseki, who had been in Bosnia [where he supervised the NATO force], been in Kosovo, started running the numbers and said, 'Let's assume the world is linear.' For five million Bosnians we had two hundred thousand people to watch over them. Now we have twenty-five million Iraqis to worry about, spread out over a state the size of California. How many people is this going to take?" The heart of the Army's argument was that with too few soldiers, the United States would win the war only to be trapped in an untenable position during the occupation.

[Tom In VA]

Then I messed up.

So it would seem that 75K was sufficient to invade.


My question is geared towards the occupation. It would seem, based on the link, that Shineski and Rummy were at loggerheads on that as well.

The acrimony between the two and the attitude Rumsfeld brought to the department led to some uniformed men referring to him as "the enemy". US News and World Report described the relationship at Shinseki's retirement: "Rumsfeld's in-your-face approach rankled Shinseki, a quiet general who tried not to make waves. The general was even publicly rebuked by Rumsfeld's staff for telling Congress it might take hundreds of thousands of troops to secure post-Saddam [Hussein] Iraq, a prediction that looks even more correct." The day after Shinseki's remarks to Congress, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz issued a statement that Shinseki's estimates were "wildly off the mark".

But in comparing "plans" and "numbers" I think it's important to distinguish if it refers to military personnel only or if it encompasses contractors as well who perform some more specialized tasks.

[PSUFAN]

This plan initially called for an invasion force of about 400,000, including support personnel. The original plan also envisioned the US leading a broad coalition, much like Operation Desert Storm.

However, Secretary Rumsfeld began reviewing the TPFDD in November 2002, trimming the number of personnel to about 75,000.

And it was spectacularly successful. What's your point?

Is the plan for an "invasion" force different than a plan for an "occupational force" ?

He's confusing the two. The "Operation" referred to above is the occupation, not the invasion. As is documented here, he was too busy masturbating about the merits of the invasion to care a whit about the occupation. We're not even talking about the invasion in this thread, until he wheels it into the room.

You asked for examples of purposeful obfuscation in this thread...there ya go. That...and the mention of the Kerry campaign.

[Tom In VA]

He's confusing the two. The "Operation" referred to above is the occupation, not the invasion.

No the quote from the link you provided clearly specified a difference in opinion as to what it would take to invade.

According to army procedure, they developed a Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) plan, an extremely intricate master plan detailing the movements of each and every unit and the "logistics tail" (the supply of fuel, spare parts, food, etc) needed to keep that unit operational. This plan initially called for an invasion force of about 400,000, including support personnel. The original plan also envisioned the US leading a broad coalition, much like Operation Desert Storm.

However, Secretary Rumsfeld began reviewing the TPFDD in November 2002, trimming the number of personnel to about 75,000

And clearly 75K or however many were actually used to invade, my guess is somewhere greater than 75K but far less than 400K were sufficient.

So since the original plan was incorrect about the invasion, isn't safe to conclude it lost credibility and therefore a reasonable "re-evaluation" as to how many it would take to occupy Iraq could have been called for ?

Granted, hindsight shows we probably needed/need more. Most importantly Rummy shouldn't ignore his generals.

[PSUFAN]

This plan initially called for an invasion force of about 400,000...

unfortunately, mvsPretzel, you can't seem to understand what is meant by the above as it continues. The 75K "invasion force" is ONLY an "invasion force". The 400K "invasion force" is an "invasion and occupation force".

[PSUFAN]

I just don't pay attention much to Monday morning quarterbacks. And that is precisely what this is.

Not exactly. Sure, they're criticizing him after the fact...but the point is, they're asking him to be relieved of his duties, because it appears that he is incompetent - and he is in a crucial position in our government...therefore he should be removed from that position.

[Tom In VA]

This plan initially called for an invasion force of about 400,000...

unfortunately, mvsPretzel, you can't seem to understand what is meant by the above as it continues. The 75K "invasion force" is ONLY an "invasion force". The 400K "invasion force" is an "invasion and occupation force".

Then why did it explicitly state "invasion" force ? Don't die on this hill PSUFAN. I mean further down in the article it does say there were differences in opinion as how many it would take to:

The general was even publicly rebuked by Rumsfeld's staff for telling Congress it might take hundreds of thousands of troops to secure post-Saddam [Hussein] Iraq, a prediction that looks even more correct."

There's the real issue.

[PSUFAN]

No the quote from the link you provided clearly specified a difference in opinion as to what it would take to invade.

Yes - that difference being, one understood the need for boots on the ground to secure Iraq, and one that dispensed with planning for the occupation altogether.

Yet, in my opinion, it's not that they didn't know occupying Iraq would take a lot of troops on the ground. They were better able to summon support for the cause when they wanted to go in if they portrayed the need for troops as slim. They knew that to mobilize and launch an invasion with 400k would have been less politically acceptable.

It's an easier sell if the dramatic need for occupational forces is obscured - which is exactly what they did, we now come to find out.

[PSUFAN]

it might take hundreds of thousands of troops to secure post-Saddam [Hussein] Iraq,

I don't know about you, Tom...but I think when Shinseki said "secure", he meant "to occupy".

[Tom In VA]

No the quote from the link you provided clearly specified a difference in opinion as to what it would take to invade.

Yes - that difference being, one understood the need for boots on the ground to secure Iraq, and one that dispensed with planning for the occupation altogether.

Yet, in my opinion, it's not that they didn't know occupying Iraq would take a lot of troops on the ground. They were better able to summon support for the cause when they wanted to go in if they portrayed the need for troops as slim. They knew that to mobilize and launch an invasion with 400k would have been less politically acceptable.

It's an easier sell if the dramatic need for occupational forces is obscured - which is exactly what they did, we now come to find out.

Which explains the 75K to 260K in less than a month. I'm hip.

So the contention would now be that 260K was insufficient and 400K would have been. I see where you're coming from.

[PSUFAN]

Bush won't remove Rumsfeld

As my initial post in the thread states, I don't expect it to happen, either.

[Tom In VA]

They knew that to mobilize and launch an invasion with 400k would have been less politically acceptable.

Less acceptable than one utilizing over 260,000 troops?

You honestly think 140,000 troops makes that much of a difference in the political calculus ..........

I'm curious if that would actually increase the casualty rate. The laymen's thought is "more people = more security". But in the environment of post war Iraq might "more people = more targets" ?

[PSUFAN]

So the contention would now be that 260K was insufficient and 400K would have been.

260K is a number that mvscal has offered us here - but I do know this, the initial occupation force was indeed insufficient. Would 400K have been more sufficient? I don't know, but certainly a larger force would have been at least incrementally better.

The essential quandry is this:

There are those for whom it was enough to ask, "Can we invade Iraq and depose Saddam"?, and there are those who understand that the rest of the sentence reads as follows, "Can we invade Iraq and depose Saddam - and then deal with the consequences".

Important distinction. If Rummy had been among the latter, I think we'd have been better off.

[PSUFAN]

So, to say that 400,000 were needed for the invasion, and oh, by the way, they would have hung around and been perfect for the occupation, is wrong. That is not how it works. We didn't need a large invasion force. And no one knows whether a greater number of occupation forces would have been better or not. If you put more troops in Iraq, you probably get more photos of flag draped coffins coming out of airplanes at Dover AFB.

The thing is, Shinseki wasn't just pulling a number out of a hat. His estimation was based on the TPFDD. There was indeed a plan to occupy Iraq, and exhaustive efforts at planning the whole production had been undertaken. In asking for a large invading and occupying force, he was essentially saying that there would be specialities and vocations represented, as you've rightly delineated above.

Basically, the 75K number was accurate when it came to the invading force - it's just that Rummy and Paul W. only wanted folks to think about that portion of the force, not the rest that would subsequently be necessary. Either that, or they were simply incompetent, as has been alleged by some of their prominent peers.

[Tom In VA]

So the contention would now be that 260K was insufficient and 400K would have been.

260K is a number that mvscal has offered us here - but I do know this, the initial occupation force was indeed insufficient. Would 400K have been more sufficient? I don't know, but certainly a larger force would have been at least incrementally better.

The essential quandry is this:

There are those for whom it was enough to ask, "Can we invade Iraq and depose Saddam"?, and there are those who understand that the rest of the sentence reads as follows, "Can we invade Iraq and depose Saddam - and then deal with the consequences".

Important distinction. If Rummy had been among the latter, I think we'd have been better off.

Agree and disagree. Assessing whether or not Rummy is or is not part of the latter is what is going on now. To dismiss him as not being concerned with dealing "with the consequences" or not giving it a thought is foolish.

To harken back to professional disagreements that in hindsight look better, is a waste of time.

What's more important is determining whether or not Rummy has the ability or temperment to execute the occupation, keeping the negative consequences as mimimum as possible. So far we have two generals who have brought forth practical "lessons learned" saying he doesn't, because he will not listen to them. Now that's key. IMHO

[PSUFAN]

We had and continue to have more than enough force to deal with any contingency in Iraq.

You're still imagining that force is the only important aspect of this. Force was well enough represented to get them into the country and to kill a bunch of the more obvious assholes. What was lacking was intelligence, organizational expertise, engineering, and resources of that kind. Those people would have comprised the balance of the 400-500k, and with a good showing, they could have better managed the aftermath.

[PSUFAN]

I'm going to take your word on it PSUFAN, because I simply do not know what those reports said and do not have enough information to formulate an informed opinion on the subject.

Do you mean the TPFDD?

If you're interested in the topic, have a look at the article I've linked to:

http://www.epic-usa.org/Default.aspx?tabid=185

As for myself, I certainly don't have the credentials to know any better than Rummy. I simply can't shake the impression, though, that the words of many who were thusly credentialed were ignored or sidestepped. That's what gets me going on the topic.

[PSUFAN]

The issue is the Iraqis' failure to step up to the plate and assume responsibility for their country.

That's where the claims of incompetence gain momentum, of course. I can imagine asking mvscal in, oh, perhaps 1998, if he thought Iraqis would have been up to the task of composing their security and governance independently after a US invasion...and he would have said,...wait for it..."of course not, dumbfuck".

Yet, here we have Cheney daydreaming with his cock in his hand about being "greeted as liberators":

http://www.informationclearinghouse.inf ... le5145.htm

Vice President Cheney: Now, I think things have gotten so bad inside Iraq, from the standpoint of the Iraqi people, my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators. And the president's made it very clear that our purpose there is, if we are forced to do this, will in fact be to stand up a government that's representative of the Iraqi people, hopefully democratic due respect for human rights, and it, obviously, involves a major commitment by the United States, but we think it's a commitment worth making. And we don't have the option anymore of simply laying back and hoping that events in Iraq will not constitute a threat to the U.S. Clearly, 12 years after the Gulf War, we're back in a situation where he does constitute a threat.

Mr. Russert: If your analysis is not correct, and we're not treated as liberators, but as conquerors, and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in Baghdad, do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly, and bloody battle with significant American casualties?

Vice President Cheney: Well, I don't think it's likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators. I've talked with a lot of Iraqis in the last several months myself, had them to the White House. The president and I have met with them, various groups and individuals, people who have devoted their lives from the outside to trying to change things inside Iraq. And like Kanan Makiya who's a professor at Brandeis, but an Iraqi, he's written great books about the subject, knows the country intimately, and is a part of the democratic opposition and resistance. The read we get on the people of Iraq is there is no question but what they want to the get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that.

With apologies to mvscal: Nice going, dumbfuck.

[PSUFAN]

88, Feith is quoted in the article, but his take on matters is not the sole focus of the article, nor is he at last portrayed favorably by Fallows.

By all means, though - read the article at some point, it's very interesting.

[PSUFAN]

Russert: do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly, and bloody battle with significant American casualties?

Cheney: Well, I don't think it's likely to unfold that way, Tim

[RadioFan]

Russert: do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly, and bloody battle with significant American casualties?

Cheney: Well, I don't think it's likely to unfold that way, Tim

And it didn't. Our casualties are totally insignificant in any strategic or tactical context. ~ And two out of three ain't baaaaaaad ~

And what's with that TRAITOR Russert even daring to ask such a question. The horrah.

[Dinsdale]

And in most of the country we were.

Damn...here I am between that rock and the hard place again...who to believe...

mvscal the All-Knowing, or someone...who served in Iraq?

They're telling two completely different stories, but I'm not sure who to believe...


Hmmm....I hate these dilemmas.

[Diogenes]

mvscal the All-Knowing, or someone...who served in Iraq?

Which is were my information came from.

Presenting me with the dilemma of who do I believe. My two cousins and a close friend from my days in the service or Dinsdale's imaginary friend.

Wait, that's no dilemma at all...

I'm going to have to go with Dimsdale's imaginary friend.

mvs misspelled where.

[PSUFAN]

So you started this thread, and then lurked in it until mvscal misspelled a word? Yikes.

[Mister Bushice]

Russert: do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly, and bloody battle with significant American casualties?

Cheney: Well, I don't think it's likely to unfold that way, Tim

And it didn't. Our casualties are totally insignificant in any strategic or tactical context.

Guess you got him for underestimating what a bunch of handwringing pussies you people are, though.

He didn't SAY casualties. He said:

long, > It has been

costly, > It continues to be

and bloody battle > more people are dying now than at any other time over the course of the war.

[Mister Bushice]

I said PEOPLE, not just US military casualties.

[Mister Bushice]

I'll be damned. I didn't see 8-2005.

Still, last month ws the second highest, and this month is not half over. I'd be willing to bet that last month and this one will be in the top three casualty wise.

Most of that will be sectarian violence.

[Jerkovich]

You're still wrong:

Iraqi Civilian Deaths
4-2006 486
3-2006 901
2-2006 688
1-2006 591
12-2005 344
11-2005 583
10-2005 465
9-2005 640
8-2005 1524
7-2005 518
6-2005 477
5-2005 572
4-2005 301
3-2005 257
2-2005 109
1-2005 103

Ouch...that had to hurt the ole vagina!

[RadioFan]

Ouch...that had to hurt the ole vagina!

Too easy.